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ABSTRACT
States around the world have signed several modern investment
treaties and free trade agreements over the past few decades. Some
of them are still in the process of being ratified, such as the TransPacific Partnership (TPP). People worldwide have severely
criticized the content of the TPP and have pointed out that the TPP
principally protects the rights of the investors while leaving citizens
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in vulnerable conditions. For instance, the language of the TPP
states in general that a measure adopted by a State to protect a
legitimate welfare objective should not be considered as indirect
expropriation except in rare circumstances. This exception and other
issues, regarding the regulatory powers of a State, have been at the
center of several debates. This article reviews some of these debates
and highlights the impact of the TPP’s language for future treaties
and agreements.
RESUMEN
Estados alrededor del mundo han firmado de manera creciente
varios tratados modernos de inversión y acuerdos de libre comercio
en las últimas décadas. Algunos de ellos todavía están en proceso de
ratificación, como el Acuerdo Transpacífico de Cooperación
Económica (TPP en sus siglas en ingles). Personas de todo el mundo
han criticado severamente las negociaciones del TPP y han señalado
que el TPP protege principalmente los derechos de los inversionistas
y deja a las comunidades en condiciones vulnerables. Por ejemplo,
el lenguaje de TPP establece en general que una medida adoptada
por un Estado para proteger un objetivo de bienestar legítimo no
debe ser considerada como expropiación indirecta excepto en raras
circunstancias. Esta excepción y otras cuestiones relativas al poder
regulador de un estado han creado varios debates. Este artículo
recolecta estos debates y destaca el impacto del lenguaje del TPP en
futuros tratados y acuerdos.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (the “TPP” or “the treaty”)
was signed on February 4, 2016. It was the end product of five
years of negotiations between twelve countries and is the largest
global trade agreement in the last twenty years.2 Prior to the
2

Once ratified, TPP would become the largest trade bloc on earth,
concentrating forty percent of the world’s gross domestic product. The
signatories represent around 40 percent of the global economy and a quarter
of world trade. Membership to the TPP is also open to other Asia-Pacific
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expansion in 2016, the TPP was a regional free trade agreement
between the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Brunei
(“TPP Member States”).3 The TPP made history as the first ever
mega-regional treaty to be concluded.4 However, its ratification
has been tainted by uncertainty after the United States Government
signed an executive order to withdraw from TPP negotiations and
the treaty overall.5
Notwithstanding the result of the TPP’s negotiations, the
language of the TPP set the basis for Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT) and Free Trade Agreement reforms that are pending
approval, ratification, and renegotiation.
Critics of the TPP, including experts in law and economics,
have warned about the dangers of the Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) mechanism included in the TPP.6 One major
critique is that this mechanism impacts the sovereign rights of a
State7 and weakens the rule of law.8 Critics contest that States’
countries, with both Republic of Korea and Indonesia expressing a strong
interest in becoming signatories. See GITANJALI BAJAJ ET AL., DLA PIPER ,
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP SERIES: NAVIGATING A NEW ERA OF
TRADE IN THE PACIFIC RIM : PART I – INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS &
INVESTOR -STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 2 (2016),
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights/Publications/2016/04/TPP%20
Series_Part_1.pdf.
3
Id. (“The signatories represent around 40 per cent of the global economy
and a quarter of world trade. Membership to the TPP is also open to other
Asia-Pacific countries, with both Korea and Indonesia expressing a strong
interest in becoming signatories.”).
4
See PETER DRAPER ET AL., EUROPEAN CTR . FOR INT’L POLITICAL ECON .,
MEGA -REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFRICAN ,
CARIBBEAN , AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES 8, (2004),
http://ecipe.org//app/uploads/2014/12/OCC22014.pdf (coining the term ‘megaregional).
5
Presidential Memo, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017).
6
162 CONG. REC. S480 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2016) (Statement of Senator Warren).
7
Opponents to the TPP have argued that in general the ISDS system attacks
the sovereignty of States because arbitral tribunals rather national courts
analyze whether government measures fulfill international investment
standards and consequently if such government can be found liable
internationally.
8
LAURENCE TRIBE ET AL., 220+ LAW AND ECONOMICS PROFESSORS URGE
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sovereign rights are affected because States do not have freedom
to adopt regulatory measures in certain circumstances under the
Treaty. This is reflected in a recent trend of cases brought by
investors, who have challenged States’ regulatory measures passed
in times of emergency, measures related to the use of natural
resources, and public health measures, all of which include
sensitive issues.9
Proponents posit that past experience has shown that ISDS
is not a threat to a national government’s regulatory power, as
many critics claim. Out of the hundreds of resolved ISDS cases
worldwide, few involved cases against legislative governmental
actions, and cases that did challenge such sovereign actions, rarely
succeeded.10 The majority of measures that are challenged by
investors involve breaches of administrative law, rather than
general regulatory powers of States.
Central to the discussion by TPP critics is the treaty’s
language defending States’ sovereign regulatory power. By
incorporating language stating that regulatory actions should not
be considered indirect expropriation, so long as they are designed
and applied to protect legitimate public objectives, critics feel as
though the TPP goes too far in protecting States’ regulatory
CONGRESS TO REJECT THE TPP AND OTHER PROSPECTIVE DEALS THAT
I=INCLUDE INVESTOR -STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS), 2, (2016),
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/isds-law-economics-professors-lettersept-2016.pdf; see also NIGEL CORY & STEPHEN EZELL, INFO . TECH . &
INNOVATION FOUND ., HOW TPP CRITICS MUDDLE FACTS, FICTIONS, AND
UNFOUNDED FEARS: A POINT-BY -POINT ANALYSIS 15 (2016),
http://www2.itif.org/2016-tpp-critics-muddle-factsfiction.pdf?_ga=2.241631746.1268927901.15379728151923363078.1537823248. (“The most serious accusation leveled against
ISDS are that it undermines state sovereignty, as it can overturn domestic
court decisions and force a country to damage its laws – both of which are
false. ISDS is not a threat to the core responsibilities of governments – it
cannot be used to attack a country’s health and social security systems, and
regulations in the TPP explicitly confirm that every country retain the right
to regulate in its public interest, including with regard to health, safety, the
financial sector, and environment protection.”).
9
Philip Morris Brands Sàrl. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7, Award (Jul. 8, 2016).
10
Cory, supra note 8, at 16.
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powers.11 These contentious TPP provisions will be analyzed in the
following sections.
II. INVESTMENT AND EXCEPTION CHAPTERS
The Investment and Exception chapters of the TPP contain
language dealing with a State’s regulatory power. The Investment
Chapter of the TPP (Chapter Nine) offers investors a guideline that
is considered to be the “Standard suite” of investment
protections.12 These provisions incorporate language such as “rare
circumstances” and “otherwise consistent with this chapter” 13 to
emphasize that regulatory measures adopted under a State power
to regulate should not be considered an indirect expropriation,
unless it meets such standards.14 There are also several key
provisions regarding investment protections in the TPP that host
States must guarantee in order to fulfill the object and purpose of
the treaty. These investment protections include, but are not limited
to: National Treatment, Most-Favorable Nation Treatment,
Minimum Standard of Treatment, and Expropriation and
Compensation standards.
Additionally, the Exception Chapter of the TPP sets the language
of the carve out clause regarding Tobacco Control.15 Both chapters
11

Regulatory measures regarding public health, safety and environment can be
considered as a legitimate public objective that a State can adopt to protect its
citizens.
12
The TPP offers what can be thought of as the standard suite of protections for
investors in the territory of the other Parties. These measures, which in the TPP
generally govern both pre-establishment and post-establishments investments,
include: National Treatment, Most Favoured Nation, Expropriation, Fair and
Equitable Treatment, and more. See John W. Boscariol & Robert A. Glasgow,
Trans-Pacific Partnership—Investment Protection and Investor-State Claims,
MCCARTHY TETRAULT (Nov. 26, 2015),
https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/terms-trade/trans-pacific-partnershipinvestment-protection-and-investor-state-claims.
13
Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 9.16, annex 9-B, Feb. 4, 2016, never ratified,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf
14
Such measures can be adopted in the context of public health, safety,
environmental and other regulatory objectives.
15
Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, art. 29.5,
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language has been heavily criticized and left open to interpretation.
This article will highlight these criticisms and interpretations
through three main considerations. The intention behind this article
is to highlight positive aspects of the TPP’s language dealing with
State power to regulate and proposes that this language be used in
future negotiations of BITs and Free Trade Agreements.

A. REGARDING “RARE CIRCUMSTANCES”
Article 9.8: Expropriation and Compensation in the TPP states that:
1. No Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered
investment either directly or indirectly through
measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization
(expropriation), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner;
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3
and 4; and
(d) in accordance with due process of law.16
This provision is similar to stipulations in other international
investment agreements (“IIAs”). It protects a covered investment
from both direct expropriation, the transfer of title or seizure of
property,17
and from indirect expropriation.18 Indirect
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Exceptions-and-GeneralProvisions.pdf.
16
Id. art. 9.8, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf.
17
Mariana Pendás & Eduardo Mathison, TPP and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: An Intertwined Spectrum of Options for Investors?, 11 GLOBAL
TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 157, 158 (2016).
18
An action or series of actions by a TPP State Member that have an effect
equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright
seizure. See GITANJALI BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (“The signatories
represent around 40 per cent of the global economy and a quarter of world
trade. Membership to the TPP is also open to other Asia-Pacific countries,
with both Korea and Indonesia expressing a strong interest in becoming
28
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expropriation has become a defining characteristic of the right to
regulate.19 In this respect, investors should be aware that the TPP
language provides certain limitations on the scope of an
investments protection and was designed to preserve the freedom
of TPP Member States to regulate in areas of public welfare,
environment, and health.20 This language was also incorporated
into Annex 9-B 3(b) of the investment chapter as an additional
source of Article 9.8 interpretation that regulates expropriation and
compensation. This annex states that:
“Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations,
except in rare circumstances.”21 (emphasis added)
From a quick reading of this provision, it seems that State’s
sovereign right to adopt regulatory action to protect legitimate
public welfare objectives should not be considered an indirect
expropriation. However, the language “except in rare
circumstances” opens the door to interpretation. Critics have
focused on the words “rare circumstances” because the Investment

signatories.”).
CHRISTIAN TIETJE, FREYA RAETENS & ECORYS, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
TRADE & DEV . COOPERATION , THE IMPACT OF INVESTOR -STATE-DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT (ISDS) IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIP 49 (2014),
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2
014/06/24/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-thettip/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf.
20
Pendás & Mathison, supra note 17, at 158–159. (“Since 2004, IIA
provisions have addressed the fear of States to provide them with the ability
to regulate health, welfare and environment issues, and at the same time, the
fear no to be impeded or punish with less investment.”).
21
Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, annex 9-B n.37 (“For greater
certainty and without limiting the scope of this subparagraph, regulatory
actions to protect public health include, among others, such measures with
respect to the regulation, pricing and supply of, and reimbursement for,
pharmaceuticals (including biological products), diagnostics, vaccines,
medical devices, gene therapies and technologies, health-related aids and
appliances and blood and blood-related products.”).
19
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Chapter of the TPP does not clarify the meaning of this standard.22
In this regard, and because of a lack of guidance, a future
international arbitral tribunal could interpret a regulation to be an
indirect expropriation even when such the measure, in another
context, could be adopted and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives.
It has been theorized that the language used in Annex 9-B,
rather than be a safeguard, can act as a loophole to allow foreign
corporations to challenge new State regulations, if such regulation
diminished the value of the investor’s operations.23 Therefore, while
the United State Trade Representative (USTR) touts this provision
to be a safeguard, the ISDS tribunal has the power to decide which
environmental or other public interest policies fall into the “rare
circumstances” loophole.24
Even when there is no elaboration on when “rare
circumstances” arise to render an otherwise non-compensable
expropriation compensable, the absence of a regulatory
expropriation in the applicable treaty does not foreclose States
defending a taking as non-compensable,25 or the investor from
defending a taking as compensable.26 In other words, if a treaty does
22

Tsai-yu Lin, Preventing Tobacco Companies’ Interference with Tobacco
Control Through Investor-State Dispute Settlement under the TPP, 8 ASIAN J.
WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 565, 576 (2013).
23
ILANA SOLOMON & BEN BEACHY , SIERRA CLUB , A DIRTY DEAL: HOW THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP THREATENS OUR CLIMATE 7 (2015),
https://content.sierraclub.org/creativearchive/sites/content.sierraclub.org.creativearchive/files/pdfs/1197%20Dirty%20Deals%20Report%20Web_03_low.pdf
(“Some argue that the TPP’s inclusion of this expansion foreign investor
right could allow a foreign corporation, like BHP Billiton, for example, to
challenge a new environmental regulation, such as additional permit
requirement, as a TPP- prohibited “indirect expropriation” if it diminished
the value of its fracking operations.”).
24
LAURENCE TRIBE ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
25
Jean Ho, Investment Protection Under Succession Treaties 32 ICSID Rev.
Foreign Investment L.J. 59, 74 (2017).
26
Les Laboratoires Servier, S.A.S. v. Republic of Poland, Case No. II
SA.Wa 838/13, Award (Redacted), ¶¶ 582-584 (Feb. 14, 2012). (“Thus, the
burden then falls onto the Claimants to show that Poland's regulatory actions
were inconsistent with a legitimate exercise of Poland's police powers. If the
30

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

not establish in which rare circumstances a State’s action can be
compensable, the parties shall follow the general principle in
international adjudication that “whoever asserts must prove”. In
order to do so, the party that asserts the claim must obtain and
present the necessary evidence in order to prove its assertion.27 The
parties might also take into consideration that any interpretation they
reach should be according to the object and purpose of the treaty.28
Independently of what side one may fall on, State or
investor, by incorporating such language in the TPP, Member States
have negotiated for this mandatory rule in order to protect their
regulatory actions. There is a well-known phrase that “every rule
has an exception,” and this language “rare circumstances” might be
one of them. It will be up to arbitral tribunals and the ability of a
party’s counsel to demonstrate that a specific State’s regulatory
action falls under such exception. In this respect, parties will play a
crucial role in overcoming and giving meaning to this high standard
of burden of proof.

B. REGARDING THE PROVISION “OTHERWISE CONSISTENT
WITH THIS CHAPTER”
Article 9.16 “Investment and Environmental, Health and other
Regulatory Objectives” is included in the Investment Chapter of the
TPP. This article states:
“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent
a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
Claimants produce sufficient evidence for such a showing, the burden shifts
to Poland to rebut it.”).
27
Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 215
(Sept. 1, 2009). (“[T]he Committee considers the general principle in ICSID
proceedings, and in international adjudication generally, to be that “who asserts
must prove”, and that in order to do so, the party which asserts must itself obtain
and present the necessary evidence in order to prove what it asserts.”)
28
See Investment, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacificpartnership/tpp-chapter-chapter-negotiating-3 (last visited Sept. 26, 2016).
31

AN ANALYSIS OF TPP’S LANGUAGE REGARDING STATES’ POWERS TO REGULATE

considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity
in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.”
(Emphasis added)29
The language “otherwise consistent with this chapter” is
essentially a window dressing. In essence, the provision states that
a party can regulate however it chooses, as long as it does not
violate other obligations stated in the investment chapter. While
the language of the TPP might “underscore” countries’ rights to
regulate in the public interest, the treaty does not actually protect
that right.30 Instead, this article will likely provide only a slight
interpretive gloss in favor of protecting public interest measures,31
indicating to investors that such regulations are still able to be
changed. For example, if good faith measures are taken in the
public interest, they can still be successfully challenged under the
agreement as violating the TPP’s investor protections and thus
negate any protections otherwise purported to be given under that
article.32
Similarly, TPP Member States have the freedom to adopt
measures appropriate to ensure that investment activity in their
territories are undertaken in a manner sensitive to their
environment, health or other regulatory objectives, provided that
such measures are not otherwise inconsistent with the investment

29
Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, art. 9.16,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf.
30
See Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, The TPP’s Investment Chapter:
Entrenching, Rather than Reforming, a Flawed System, COLUMBIA CTR . ON
SUSTAINABLE INV . 2 (Nov. 2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/11/TPPentrenching-flaws-21-Nov-FINAL.pdf. (“That article [9.16] provides no such
real protection. Rather, it simply notes that the government can regulate in
the public interest as long as, when doing so, the government complies with
the Investment Chapter’s requirement regarding treatment of foreign
investors and investments.”).
31
Trading Views: Real Debates on Key Issues in TPP, Hearing on Trans
Pacific Partnership Before the Subcomm. On Trade, 114th Cong. (Dec. 2,
2015) (Statements of Ways and Means Democrats).
32
Johnson & Sachs, supra note 30, at 2.
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chapter.33 In other words, Member States have the freedom to
adopt regulations assuming that these measures do not otherwise
constitute a breach of obligations set forth in the investment
chapter. It is important to note here that TPP Member States have
clearly used language favoring States’ regulatory powers. In this
respect, Article 9.16 expressly states that Member States have not
only legitimacy to adopt regulatory actions recognized in article 9.
8, but also to maintain or enforce such measures to ensure that
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental, health, or other regulatory objectives.34
Nevertheless, a state that is going to exercise such regulatory
power should not act arbitrarily or in violation of other obligations
stated in the investment chapter, as is required by the language
“otherwise consistent with this chapter.” Therefore, in the context
of the TPP and ISDS, State regulation should protect legitimate
objectives in order to guarantee investor rights. Based on fairness,
it cannot be justified to grant rights to one party (a State) and not
another (an investor).
This provision of Article 9.16 (“otherwise consistent with
this chapter”) can help lawyers to improve their arguments during
arbitration proceedings. In this regard, parties in a dispute must
demonstrate that either the State respected its obligations when
exercising its legitimate regulatory power, or that such regulatory
power did not comport with the treaty’s explicit obligations.

33

The briefing also states that The TPPA’s Chapter 9 (the Investment
Chapter): (i) guarantees important protections to investments made by those
nationals or companies; and (ii) contains investor-State dispute settlement
(ISDS) provisions that entitle investors to submit disputes with TPP State
Member to binding international arbitration. Much is the same as in other
free trade and investment-protection agreements, but there are important
differences requiring careful attention. See Investment Protection and
Investor-State Dispute Settlement under the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://knowledge.freshfields.com/en/Global/r/1325/investment_protection_a
nd_investor-state_dispute.
34
Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, art. 9.16,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Investment.pdf.
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C. THE TPP DOES NOT INCLUDE ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH
ISSUES AS CARVE OUTS.
Article 29.5 “Tobacco Control Measures” states that:
“A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of
Chapter 9 (Investment) with respect to claims
challenging a tobacco control measure35 of the Party.
Such a claim shall not be submitted to arbitration under
Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party has made
such an election….” (Emphasis added)36
This article of the TPP embodies the carve-out clause of
Tobacco Control Measures.37 While the treaty has established filter
mechanisms to avoid international claims38 in other areas of public
35

Id., art. 29.5 n.12, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-TextExceptions-and-General-Provisions.pdf (“A tobacco control measure means a
measure of a Party related to the production or consumption of manufactured
tobacco products (including products made or derived from tobacco), their
distribution, labelling, packaging, advertising, marketing, promotion, sale,
purchase, or use, as well as enforcement measures, such as inspection,
recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. For greater certainty, a measure
with respect to tobacco leaf that is not in the possession of a manufacturer of
tobacco products or that is not part of a manufactured tobacco product is not
a tobacco control measure.”).
36
Id. art. 29.5, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Exceptionsand-General-Provisions.pdf.
37
Id. It seems that this carve-out was formulated in response to the
investment claim that a multinational Tobacco company brought against
Australia to challenge the Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill (2011). See also
Taejoon Ahn, THE UTILITY OF CARVE-OUT CLAUSES IN ADDRESSING
REGULATORY CONCERNS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 12 ASIAN
INT’L ARB . J. 65, 72, 76 (2016) (“[T]o avoid regulatory concerns in certain
regulatory areas, states need to carve out certain areas involving their vital
regulatory concerns from the scope of international obligations in advance in
the exercise of their sovereign choice. This is because just as the consent to
international investment disciplines depends on a sovereign choice of each
state, so the scope of the consent, namely the choice of certain areas
included in the agreement and the exclusion of other areas from the
agreement, is up to the sovereign state . . . . The carve-out clause is expected
to be adopted by the new version of investment treaties as an effective
instrument for alleviating regulatory concerns in terms of legal certainty,
predictability and political acceptability.”).
38
Johnson & Sachs, supra note 30, at 3.
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interest such as taxation measures39 and financial services
regulations, this does not mean that such regulations are not subject
to conditions, such as the “exceptional circumstances” measure,
included in Article 29.3 of the treaty.40
The fact that there are no filter mechanisms, as explained
above, relating to environmental protection or public health issues
in the TPP, has been criticized.41 Authors have questioned why this
clause is so narrow, applying only to tobacco measures, when
governments deal with a much wider array of health and
environmental issues which would merit exclusion from arbitration
proceedings just as often.42
Other authors have used this carve-out clause to demonstrate
that TPP Member States intentionally protected their regulatory
power when public welfare objectives are at issue.43 The will of
TPP Member States is clear when public welfare objectives are
39

Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 13, art. 29.4.9,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Exceptions-and-GeneralProvisions.pdf (“Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Singapore from
adopting taxation measures no more trade restrictive than necessary to
address Singapore’s public policy objectives arising out of its specific
constraints of space.”).
40
Mélida Hodgson, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Investment Chapter Set a
New Worldwide Standard COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES 1 (Nov. 9 2015),
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D86Q25WM/download
(“Then there is a provision in the General Exceptions chapter allowing
temporary financial safeguards in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ Clearly, the
shadow of the Argentina investment jurisprudence looms large—various
Asian-Pacific countries themselves had to deal with a scarring financial
crisis around the same time.”); see also Nahila Cortes, Indirect
Expropriation under the TPP: A New Frontier for the Right of States to
Regulate?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Dec. 20 2015),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/12/20/indirectexpropriation-under-the-tpp-a-new-frontier-for-the-right-of-states-toregulate/ (“Article 29.3 recognizes that the State may adopt or maintain
restrictive temporary financial safeguards in exceptional circumstances if
they are consistent with the TPP.”).
41
Johnson & Sachs, supra note 30, at 3.
42
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, How the Investment Chapter of the TransPacific Partnership Falls Short, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. BLOG (Nov.
6, 2015), https://www.iisd.org/blog/how-investment-chapter-trans-pacificpartnership-falls-short.
43
GITANJALI BAJAJ ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
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involved, such as the regulation of tobacco packaging, which is that
States should have more leeway and protections to regulate.44
The fact that tobacco control measures are continually used
as examples of States’ regulatory power to protect public health,
and excluded from international claims, can be used as an analogy
in future environmental cases. States could establish that
environmental measures similar to tobacco control measures are
adopted to protect their citizens’ health, and should be excluded
from international claims and considered as part of a State
sovereign power to regulate. In general, both the tobacco and
environmental State regulatory powers protect public welfare
objectives. The question of why environmental, health, and other
measures were not also incorporated as carve-outs in the TPP may
not be solved in the near future. Without a doubt, the incorporation
of tobacco control measures is a positive step in the development
of the international investment regime. Continued discussion of
these environmental and health issues will help to set new
standards to be included as carve-outs in future BITs and other Free
Trade Agreements.
CONCLUSION
One cannot deny the tremendous work that TPP’s Member
States have put in to incorporate standards that were the subject of
criticism over the past few years, in particular the express
incorporation of the State power to regulate based on legitimate
public welfare objectives. The fact that this provision is included
in the TPP progresses the development of the international
investment arbitration regime and opens the doors for future
discussions in the field. This article presents analysis of TPP treaty
language and highlights the positive aspects of it, with the aim of
encouraging the audience to consider the positive impacts of this
language for future BITs and Free Trade Agreements.
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